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India has emerged as the Asia’s new economic power. Many studies have applauded its significant 
economic development. Recently, however, Indian economy has also experienced sluggish growth and 
has faced pessimistic prediction. This paper will explore the reasons behind these divergent views by 
investigating India’s industrial strategies and the structural characteristics of economic governance 
through an examination of the relationship between Indian government and businesses by firm type and 
industrial sector. 
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The emergence of India as Asia’s new economic power has been universally assumed for 
sometime now. However, recently India has been charged with experiencing a “Hindu rate of 
growth,” a term used by critics to compare the country’s unexpectedly sluggish growth to the 
movement of a slothful elephant. This paper will explore the reasons behind these divergent 
views by investigating India’s industrial developmental strategies and the structural 
characteristics of economic governance through an examination of the relationship between 
government and businesses in a macro perspective. 
Many theories and models have explained the optimal roles of government and markets 
regarding economic growth over the past few decades. These studies have typically 
flourished within a wide spectrum from statism to liberalism. However, today’s consensus 
opinion contends that drawing a dichotomy between these two contrasting ideologies is 
meaningless, and that engaging in a relevant discussion should clarify which relationship 
between state and market is more appropriate (Evans, 1995). In other words, it is more 
important to analyze how the structural characteristics of the relationships between 
government and firms—the two pivotal actors in economy—influence economic growth 
from contrasting perspectives. 
After India gained independence from British rule, its nascent government undertook 
serious state-led industrialization efforts using the former Soviet Union’s planned economy 
as its benchmark. Because of the structures of Indian government’s industrial policies, Indian 
industrial activities became very passive and submissive. Under this socialist economy, India 
witnessed growing inefficiencies and corruption that brought about an economic crisis in the 
mid-1990s consequentially. To overcome this economic difficulty, the Indian government 
adopted a completely different economic approach based on neo-liberalism and New Public 
Management system. This large-scale economic reform used a free-market economy to 
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reduce the scale of economic regulations substantially. 
This dramatic structural transition shifted the path of economic policy and induced 
important changes in economic governance. Most of all, exclusive economic networks of 
intimate rent-seeking relationships have been changed into a cooperative structure that can 
generate positive synergistic effects. However, this seemingly favorable change could not 
have achieved what were expected, because of the path-dependent nature of rent-seeking 
relationships—the result of decentralized soft state with multilayered socio-cultural attributes. 
Indian bureaucrats and politicians have not prioritized inclusive economic growth but shown 
strong populist tendencies by implementing policies for favoring groups that seek their own 
political/economic benefits.  
Thus, Indian policy cohesiveness and bureaucratic autonomy have been impaired and 
Indian government failed to pursue long-term economic strategies. In particular, its industrial 
policies have oscillated between redistribution-oriented socialism and market-oriented 
capitalism. Continuing uncertainty in policy direction has led to questions about the 
practicality of such policies whenever India’s state-led economic growth loses its driving 
force or diverges from the original objective. 
Based on this political economy perspective, this paper will review the development of 
Indian economic governance by tracing Indian government’s industrial development 
strategies since its independence period. In particular, the paper will focus on what kind of 
relationship between state and market has been established in the context of India’s 
economic system transition.  
 
 
2. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES BY FIRM TYPE 
 
2.1. Industrial Development Strategies of Conglomerates 
 
Institutionalization of Rent-Seeking Relationship under License-Raj System  
Soon after achieving independence from British rule, India’s government established the 
‘Mahalanobis model’, which emphasized a state-planned economy founded on Nehruvian-
socialism (Chakravarty, 1987). This model suggests that government regulations should be 
strengthened because a laissez-faire approach that leaves monopolistic conglomerates 
independent would exploit consumers and small business threatening the balance of social 
development to public interest. The Industry Development & Regulation Act and the 
Monopoly & Trade Restriction Act were enacted to facilitate this economic ideology. 
Through these acts, India instituted strict regulations on every aspect of conglomerate 
business activities in the name of protecting public interests from monopolistic economic 
activities. Under such state-dominated power disequilibrium, firms had little incentive to 
increase productivity or competitiveness. Instead, they focused on solidifying formal and 
informal relationships with the government by providing government officials with a diverse 
range of benefits (mostly political funds) in order to receive preferential treatment. Rent-
seeking relationship became gradually institutionalized by so-called license-permit raj 
system. This made firms indulge in political lobby activities to maintain their monopolistic 
or oligopolistic benefits. In other words, industrial licensing system induced firms to spend 
time and energy on consolidating more complicated and multilayered rent-seeking 
relationships instead of strengthening its market competitiveness. Consequently, some of 
domestic conglomerates became powerful special interest groups that prioritized their 
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interests over public interest. Their selfish economic activities combined with political 
interests, deepened the inefficiency of the country’s economic system while weakening 
industrial competitiveness in general (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). 
In the meanwhile, the Indian National Congress (INC) which ruled for a considerable 
time since the national independence, was defeated by the Janata Party (JP) in the March 
1977 elections. After experiencing an unexpected political defeat, Indira Gandhi, the party 
leader of the INC, sought to achieve broad economic reforms and industrial changes by 
emphasizing market-friendly components in order to recapture INC’s position as the ruling 
party. These policy changes were generally viewed as a radical transformation; the Times of 
India commented that “India’s policy priority has been completely changed from re-
distribution to growth” (Ahluwalia, 2002). 
However, these radical policy changes could not induce fundamental changes in the 
institutional system because they were not driven by a genuine economic reform-mindedness 
for system transformation but by Indira Gandhi’s political motivation to reclaim power. In 
other words, she was desperate to gain political support and receive funds from firms to 
ensure political survival. Therefore, the pro-business strategy at this time intended to confer 
favors to firms that were dissatisfied with strict government regulations. This meant that the 
Indian government’s economic reform efforts were inconsistent, making Indian government 
vulnerable to changing interests and demands from firms and other special interest groups. 
For example, the Indian government tried to open a domestic market, but encountered a 
strong backlash from its patrons. So it responded by returning to protectionism policy lest its 
business patrons’ withdraw their support. The rent-seeking relationship had intensified 
around the industrial licensing system, which extended its sphere of influence to social 
welfare, health care, defense, and taxes, thus limiting the scope of large-scale economic 
reform. In this political environment, meanwhile, the INC leader Rajiv Gandhi, who had 
succeeded his mother, attempted an even more ambitious economic liberalization initiative. 
However, as he also faced strong opposition and policy resistance from various interest 
groups, his efforts were soon frustrated (Frankel, 2005).  
Despite the limited scope and extent of India’s industrial development strategies during 
this period, India did experience some positive economic growth and improved its industrial 
development strategy. For example, the government began to display favorable attitudes and 
form cooperative relationships with firms. This was in contrast to the former Indian 
government’s industrial policy, which recognized firms only as objects that should be 
controlled and fully managed through aggressive and coercive anti-business policy initiatives. 
In other words, some partial policy modifications served as a momentum to change the 
established rent-seeking relationship in some degree and created a more flexible pro-business 
climate. Moreover, the gradual policy shift during this period mitigated the shock of rapid 
economic policy transition arising from India’s unexpectedly economic crisis during the 
1990s (Basu and Maertens, 2007; Nayar, 2002). 
 
A Vitalized Business Community and the Shift to a Cooperative Relationship between 
Government and Firms 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the limitations of India’s socialist economic system were 
exposed in earnest. The Indian government could not respond quickly to a rapidly changing 
global economic environment so the nation suffered its worst economic crisis under the IMF 
bailout program. The World Bank subsequently pressured Indian government to change its 
state-led economic system pointing out the drawbacks of excessive economic regulations and 
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federal deficits as a precondition for extending international loans. At the same time, a 
number of reformative Indian economists who had studied abroad in Western countries—
including Manmohan Singh, Chidambaram, and Montek Singh—returned to India. They 
typically espoused a neoliberal economic ideology that asserted the importance of  
institutional change to achieve economic growth based on pro-capitalism perspective. The 
Indian government appointed them to high official positions, thereby laying out a 
cornerstone of large-scale, market-oriented economic reform (Kochanek, 1987). By 
embracing the ideology put forward by these reformers, the Indian government transformed 
the laws regulating monopolies and oligopolies into the New Competition Law. It was this 
law that facilitated the principles of market economy and free industrial competition by 
implementing a radical industrial deregulation policy and privatizing most government-
owned enterprises as well (Chaudhuri, 2002). 
At the same time, Indian domestic conglomerates also have been restructuring—changing 
from their traditional family management systems into more transparent professional 
management model. They have also attempted to discard traditional government-business 
relationships. Particularly, it is worth noting the critical role of the business community, 
including the Federation of India Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Associated 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), and Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII). These business communities played an important role in shaping government-
business relationships in recent years. Although those business communities may differ in 
terms of background and purposes, scope and scale of members, and management and policy 
preferences, they are similar in the context of focusing mainly on establishing and 
maintaining development-oriented collaborative relationships between government and firms. 
Indeed, they often provide their member firms an opportunity to participate in the economic 
policy-making process to exchange a wide range of information within the industrial sector, 
thus creating more efficient and transparent policy agendas (Kong and Balatchandirane, 
2004). 
In addition, these business communities often conduct an arbitration of internal conflicts 
between firms. For example, CII established Associated Construction & Investment 
Company to arbitrate disputes between each sub-industrial section while facilitating the 
exchange of information between internal and external industrial sectors to coordinate 
diverging opinions. CII has also expanded its economic governance boundary by building 
cooperative partnerships with civic organizations, thus showing that it recognizes the 
importance of corporate social responsibility and moral obligations in sustaining economic 
development (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Fisman and Khanna, 2004).  
In this respect, the private interest government theory highlights the positive role of those 
business organizations that serve public interests by converting the collective interest, even 
though they are fundamentally motivated by private benefits. For instance, business 
communities can enhance the quality of public policy by facilitating an exchange of 
insightful information and practical knowledge. This exchange can contribute to an efficient 
policy decision-making process through cooperative networks while also mitigating any 
unfavorable outcomes from excessive state intervention (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). To 
summarize, the current Indian business communities differ from those of the past in respect 
to the prioritized interests of individual firms. They have played a pivotal role in creating 
efficient economic governance that embraces governments, foreign firms, experts, civic 
organizations, and international organizations and so on.  
Despite all the efforts to construct collaborative economic governance, however, while  
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the rate of economic growth has increased as much as 8-10 percent, there has been no 
substantial increase in the real employment rate. India’s industrial inequality has also 
escalated, resulting in a widening gap between firm types and industrial sector. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)—which recaptured its position as the 
ruling party in the 2009 elections—leads a coalition government that proposes modifying 
industrial policies to achieve a balance of economic growth and equity, two contrasting 
political economic ideologies, while somewhat sacrificing the speed of economic 
liberalization (Chibber, 2003). Based on this political interest, the Indian government has 
increased the industrial regulations on conglomerates again. This redistribution-oriented 
policy has created a dilemma for the Indian government and conglomerates. Most of 
conglomerates have criticized the industrial policy retreat of the UPA coalition government 
as the simple outcome of democratic populism (Mohan, 2010; Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). 
In these circumstances, India has been confronting a multifaceted discussion on the balance 
of economic growth and social equity by the terms of inclusive economic strategy. 
 
2.2. Industrial Development Strategies of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
 
Protectionism of SMEs and Solidification of the Rent-Seeking Relationship 
The Indian government has traditionally offered defensive policy tools and unconditional 
preferences for SMEs rather than strengthening their market competitiveness. In 1954, the 
Indian government enacted the Industrial Development and Regulation Act. This act was 
intended to protect the activities of small and medium-sized industries. Through the Factories 
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Act, the Indian government also implemented intentional policy gaps between conglomerates 
and small firms. This restricted the flow of human resources between industries and led to a 
separated labor market. In fact, India’s protectionist policies for SMEs were only a symbol of 
aspiring to balance inter-industrial development based on a socialist economy perspective.  
However, such protectionist inter-industry schism adversely impacted the growth of 
small firms and rather consolidated the grantor-beneficiary relationship between government 
and small firms further ultimately (Mazumdar, 1997). Moreover, it incurred even an unequal 
government distribution among SEMs. Some of them enjoyed the exclusive policy subsidies 
for a long time, while the other SEMs and new entrants that were not officially registered 
received no benefits from the government. This, not surprisingly, produced the 
disequilibrium between SEM beneficiaries. In the end, the unrelenting rent-seeking interests 
of government and SMEs hampered industrial modernization of SMEs sector and ultimately 
reduced their ability to compete in market (Das, 2008). 
 
Reduction of Protective Policies and SMEs’ Policy Resistance 
Concomitant with the fully fledged economic reforms of the 1990s, there was an attempt 
for changes in the direction of SMEs policy as well. Small Business Council and Economic 
Advisory Board under the Prime Minister’s office made an endeavor to reduce the scope of 
SMEs protectionist measures regardless of the opposition of vested interest SEMs groups 
and unfavorable opinion. Under the heated controversy, by the beginning of the 2000s, small 
firms autonomously began to recognize a need for reformative initiatives to sustain their 
development in the long term. Accordingly, in order to respond to their positive attitudes, the 
Indian government formulated market-oriented reform initiatives for the SEMs. For example, 
the government revised the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Act to 
minimize unnecessary state intervention and make necessary adjustments to the protectionist 
provisions in 2006. Also, many direct-aid policies and extended indirect policy initiatives  
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(e.g., infrastructure, information, and loans) were trimmed to facilitate innovative self-
management. In 2009, the Prime Minster and 19 small-firms representatives met to negotiate 
moderate regulations. They mutually agreed to establish a special committee to coordinate 
SMEs policies on taxes, loans, insolvency/liquidation, marketing, labor, infrastructure, and 
technological development of SMEs. 
Yet despite these positive changes, India’s SEMs policies continue to be viewed as 
diversifying and balancing the integrity of an essentially industrial foundation. Above all, 
most small-medium enterprises in India expressed strong dissatisfaction at the downsizing of 
aid and still discredit their self-capabilities through economic liberalization.  Indian SEMs 
still depend strongly on a national protectionism policy under the existed rent-seeking 
relationship thus proving that it is still hard to build up new path of cooperative relationships 
between government and SEMs (Morris and Basant, 2005; Pradhan, 2010). 
 
 
3. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
 
3.1. Industrial Development Strategies in the Manufacturing Sector 
 
Promoting manufacturing sector as strategic industry and Deepening Interest Conflicts  
The Indian government has recently been concentrating on promoting a number of 
policies to restructure domestic industries. Because tertiary industry rather than 
manufacturing industry has been developed earlier, economic growth of labor-intensive and 
large-scale sectors has been limited. However, lack of domestic resources and technologies 
for the development of manufacturing sector has led the Indian government to actively 
pursue multinational enterprise investment, including large-scale foreign capital and human 
resources, to revitalize its infrastructures and optimize its industrial environments of 
manufacture industry. 
A number of manufacturing-sector development projects have accordingly been 
implemented in 220 provinces across India. For more efficient policy implementation in 
manufacturing sector, the Indian central government has attempted to accelerate economic 
decentralization. In particular, its discretionary authority on the matter of land acquisition 
and the relocation of local residents have been transferred to state-local level governments. 
This has created not only more open economic governance structure but has also added more 
layers to the already convoluted interest conflicts surrounding the development of 
manufacturing industry (Bardhan, 2002; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). In addition, it has 
intensified ideological confrontations over economic development, the environment, human 
rights, and other issues. Thus, the formation of cooperative relationships among the various 
economic actors—including multinational corporations/domestic firms, central/local 
governments, and local communities—has emerged as a significant policy agenda in 
fostering the manufacturing sector (Chhibber and Eldersveld, 2000; Chakraborty and Basu, 
2002). 
It should be noted that India traditionally is antagonistic toward foreign multinational 
enterprises, particularly in its local provinces, because of its historical colonial experience. 
For example, Indian local villages have uniquely traditional self-governing local autonomy, 
the so-called Panchayat institution such as tribal governments and village council, 
established over a long time. Such informal institutions tend to exert greater influence over 
political power relations within the local community than the central government. The local 
 JIHO JANG, JUNG-YUL KIM, AND YOUNG-HEE CHO 108 
 
ruling class such as local elites, rich farmers, and the upper caste, had generally intimate 
relationships with state-level government bureaucrats, local politicians, civic organizations, 
and the media. These relationships are optimally reflected in their interests in various local 
policies. In some cases, they have even utilized political strategies for the salience of 
sensitive social issues over local development projects in order to secure vested rather than 
public interests. Several manufacturing industrial projects cases in past years—for example, 
Tata, Posco, and Vendanta—displayed complicated interest conflicts because of inefficient 
economic governance based on the rent-seeking relationship among various stakeholders 
(Das, 2005; Mukhopadhyay, 2006; Vachani, 2008). As a result, India failed to achieve the 
expected outcomes, which meant that the rent-seeking relationships between the government 
and firms remained intact. For this reason, some studies have pointed out that the high 
growth of manufacturing industry immediately after reform was likely a temporary outcome 
of an increased flow of foreign capital, which adversely influenced total factor productivity 
(Pack, 2000; Kochhar et al., 2006; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005). 
 
Conflicts in Labor Relations in Manufacturing Sector 
Another major obstacle to the successful development of India’s manufacturing sector is 
the Indian government’s strict regulations concerning labor relations. For example, the 
Contract Labor Act and the Industrial Dispute Act was enacted to protect of workers socialist 
economic ideology. According to this law, a firm with more than 100 employees is required 
to obtain government’s permission to fire employees, reduce its workforce, and close its 
business. Manufacturers have therefore shown conservative attitudes toward recruiting 
employees and preferring to reduce their workforce and thus constrain the creation of new 
jobs (Agarwala, 2008; Gangopadhyay and Wadhwa, 1994). 
Since labor unions exert considerable influence in political elections, Indian politicians 
have been forced to accede to their policy demands to be elected. This hampers politicians in 
achieving policy consistency of economic liberalization. The process of revision of the labor 
law and of a recruitment-dismissal system toward economic liberalization provides insights 
into how the political interests of policy decision maker are well aligned with those of labor 
union. This rent-seeking relationship have consequentially opposed neo-liberal labor policies 
and also deteriorated India’s market-oriented industrial strategy to vitalize manufacturing 
sector. For example, the unions consistently argued that the process of flexibility of labor 
market should be agreed to through social consent based on the National Common Minimum 
Program which preferred socialistic policy. In this way, the central government’s industrial 
policy in manufacturing sector has often been delayed by labor regulations because of strong 
opposition from labor unions and civic organizations. Yet, on the other hand, some state-
level governments have enforced radical reforms to revise labor law and successfully break 
up the chronic rent-seeking relationships among government, unions, and firms 
(Gangopadhyay and Wadhwa, 1994). 
 
Activation of Consultative Body for Arbitration Interest Conflicts  
The Indian government began to be acutely aware of the importance of establishing 
cooperative economic governance to promote its manufacturing sector given the political 
economic background as mentioned above. The government has therefore designed various 
institutional mechanisms to arbitrate conflicts among stakeholders based on the synergistic 
effects of the government-business relationship (Prichett, 1997). For instance, the Indian 
government has established a high-level consultative committee on manufacturing to gather 
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various opinions of the hands-on workers and arbitrate policy conflict among governments, 
firms, local communities, and others. The members of committee were drawn from diverse 
public sector, including the Ministry of Finance, the Economic Advisory Council to Prime 
Minister, and the Planning Commission. The National Manufacturing Competitiveness 
Council (NMCC) established in 2004 by extension is composed of government officials, 
business executives, and economists from diverse fields; they constructed public-private 
partnerships to develop infrastructure of manufacturing sector. They also arbitrate policy 
disputes within manufacturing sectors or between inter-industry sectors furthermore. At the 
same time, the Indian government kept on pushing ahead various policies to promote market-
friendly environments and drastically reduce the scope of regulations on many industrial 
activities in manufacturing sector. As a result, the manufacturing industrial growth rate has 
increased rapidly and contributed to the development of national economy.   
On the other hand, distributive problem in India has become significant. Economic 
inequality among social classes and the imbalance of inter-industry in manufacturing sector 
have also escalated. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government couldn’t 
help taking public opinion into consideration and modifying industrial policies to achieve a 
balance of economic growth and social equity, while somewhat sacrificing the speed of 
manufacturing sector’s development. This change from development-oriented policy to 
redistribution-oriented policy has created a dilemma for the Indian government regarding 
economic development and inclusive growth. Domestic industrial firms and foreign investors 
have criticized that the retreat of the industrial policy led by the UPA coalition government 
was a simple outcome of democratic populism (Mohan, 2010). 
Moreover, in this political/economic turmoil, Indian government’s capacity to realize 
inclusive growth policy has been limited by the persistent rent-seeking relationship. This has 
produced unsatisfactory outcomes given the scale of investment activity in the manufacturing 
sector (Chand and Sen, 2002). 
 
 
Table 3. Industrial Development Strategies and Institutional Characteristics of Manufacturing Sector 
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3.2. Industrial Development Strategies in the Service Sector 
 
State-led industrial development strategy based on market competition 
Unlike the typical process of industrial development stage elsewhere, the service sector in 
India revitalized before the manufacturing sector development. In particular, IT-related firms 
played a vital role in Indian’s economy development by sustaining the highest level of 
competitiveness in the global market. A number of studies have analyzed the factors that 
influenced the development of India’s IT industries then commonly pointed out that Indian 
government applied to IT industries a market economy mechanism from the beginning. 
If one looks closely at the evolution of the IT industry, it is clear that the state took an 
active lead and provided institutional support from the initial stage until a solid industrial 
foundation has been established.  
During the 1970s, the Indian government promoted simultaneously the hardware and 
software IT industries expecting synergistic effects of both sides. However, this action only 
has deepened confusion of inter-industrial policy. The Indian government thereafter had 
changed overall policy direction into promoting software industry. For this purpose, 
Software Export Scheme was enacted in 1972 in order to vitalize export software industry at 
the beginning. However, these initial efforts did not initially produce significant outcomes 
because of the high cost of entering the global market. After then, the Indian government 
enacted the New Computer Policy in 1984 to develop more progressive policy initiatives and 
incentives for increasing the productivity and profitability of the software industry (Mukherji,  
2009).  
From the perspective of state intervention, the role of the Indian government in the IT 
industry is not so different from that of other industrial sectors. However, it differed greatly 
in the way of government intervention and the characteristics of the regulations. It was quite 
similar to the East-Asian model of economic development—a model that government act as 
a driving force to vitalize, to some extent, the IT industry while effectively increasing 
industrial competitiveness in the market system. Most of all, the India IT industry has 
dispersed market power and is less prone to fostering rent-seeking relationships between 
government and firms. Consequently, it has successfully established effective economic 
governance based on cooperative government-business relationship. 
This political phenomenon supports the embedded state autonomy theory that 
emphasized the synergistic effects of the interactions between government and business. 
According to this theory, as government officials gain more autonomy to the extent, they 
would become less vulnerable to the organizations that pursue private benefits and, as a 
result, they become more likely to produce desirable network settings. A number of rigorous 
case studies about high-tech IT industry of India have verified voluntary interactions 
between government and business in the Indian economy development process (Evans, 1997; 
Calì and Sen, 2011).  
By the late 1980s, the Indian government’s strategy of IT industry transitioned from a 
state-planned to a market-oriented policy because it was convinced that allowing IT 
companies to compete in free markets would be more effective given the natures of the 
software industry (i.e., its small size and creative content orientation). The Indian 
government enacted several policies and regulations to dramatically loosen its restrictions on 
free competition in market and provide a healthy business environment; For example, the 
Software Policy (1986), Software Technology Parks of India (1988), Import Duties on 
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Imported Software (1992-1995), and Income Tax Exemption (1993-1999). 
Catching up with government’s policy change, IT companies also undertook substantial 
efforts to improve their productivity in market. The IT firms, which once focused mainly on 
outsourcing opportunities, extended their discretionary boundary into decision making, 
research and development, and organizational management at this time. They also physically 
expanded by establishing overseas branch offices and building strategic alliances with local 
counterparts in foreign countries (Athreye, 2005). This sustainable development can be 
explained by the preceding groundwork laid by the Indian government to establish a 
cooperative government-business relationship with IT companies (Arora and Gambardella, 
2005). 
 
Emergence of IT firm’s conglomeration and rent-seeking relationship 
As the size of IT industry becomes bigger, the conflicts of the vested interest become 
greater. Furthermore, as a few of IT firms recently merged into conglomerates, the existing 
desirable cooperative relationship of government and business has been transformed 
gradually. Some scholars shed lights on the negative aspects of an intimate relationship 
between government and IT firms. They contended that IT industrial development is not 
different from outcome of intertwined conflicts and the interests of stakeholders as in all 
other industrial sectors. Such intimacy between the two main actors induces rent-seeking 
efforts by government officials and special interest groups, thereby hampering sound 
economic development and IT industry’s free competition system has been diluted as a result. 
Moreover, Indian government has increased IT industrial regulations since the 2000s in order 
to rectify internal unfair competition and industrial imbalance in terms of inclusive growth. 
 To overcome this political/economic environment, IT firms strengthened lobbying 
activities and motivated to have a formal or informal connection with government. 
Politicians and government officials also want to keep their positions and power, even if it 
means that they must associate themselves with illegal political funding from such firms. 
This mutual need results in an exclusive rent-seeking relationship between government and 
business. Such a relationship will, in turn, lead to the redistribution of resources to  
 
Table 4. Industrial Development Strategies and Institutional Characteristics of IT Sector 
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unproductive activities rather than facilitate IT industrial productivity and market 
competitiveness to achieve sound economic growth. Market-oriented industrial policy in IT 
sector basically has been maintained up to now. Nevertheless, the changes of government 






Indian government established serious state-led industrialization policy based on a 
socialist economy after independence from British rule. At first, Indian government intended 
to balance between social equality and industrial development by regulating monopolies and 
oligopolies in market. Indian government has used very oppressive and coercive regulation 
methods based on state-dominant viewpoints. It caused the intimate rent-seeking relationship 
between government and business that has been gradually established across the industrial 
sectors especially surrounding industrial licensing-raj system. Under this socialist economy, 
India witnessed growing inefficiencies and corruption, which brought about an economic 
crisis in the mid-1990s consequentially. 
Given these situations, the Indian government attempted to transform socialist policy into 
Market-oriented industrial development strategy by reducing government regulation and 
increasing the autonomy of businesses. Indian government tried to play a positive role in 
acting as a driving force for rapid economic development. For instance, the state actively 
promoted pro-business environments and drove the revitalization of the manufacturing and 
IT sectors by cultivating selected industries and promoting policy initiatives that facilitate 
business activities. This change of industrial development strategy led to positive 
consequences that interactive cooperative relationship between government and firms built 
up better economic governance. Thus, the Indian government has consistently made an effort 
to shape market-oriented industrial development strategy from a macro perspective, although 
industrial development process has diverged by firm type or industry sector. 
On the other hand, as examined in the previous section, Indian government pro-market 
industrial policies has become more vulnerable to the demands of various interest groups 
under complicated decentralized system in the pursuit of inclusive economic growth recently. 
The rent-seeking relationship between government and business was still remained 
(scattered) across the industry and the complicated interest conflicts surrounding industrial 
development have adversely affected its institutional transition to a market economy. In 
particular, the rent-seeking relationship between government and business can still be easily 
justified as a permissible political activity within India’s exclusive policy network which 
hindered sustainable economic development. From the perspective of economic governance, 
this Indian case study implies that the relationship between state and market is more 
important than the contents of industrial development strategy. At all events, India’s 
industrial development strategies have been gradually evolving toward a sustainable 
economic growth by a trial-and-error process. In the long term, India may well be on the 
right track to achieve inclusive growth based on collaborative economic governance.  
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